Aggregation with Cournot competition: an empirical investigation by Koebel, Bertrand & Laisney, François
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Aggregation with Cournot competition:
an empirical investigation
Bertrand Koebel and Franc¸ois Laisney
24 June 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72191/
MPRA Paper No. 72191, posted 27 June 2016 18:57 UTC
Aggregation with Cournot competition:
an empirical investigation
Bertrand Koebel∗ and François Laisney∗∗
June 2016
Abstract. This paper empirically investigates the existence of Cournot equi-
librium and the validity of the Le Chatelier-Samuelson (LCS) principle in the
aggregate. Whereas two well known existence conditions are statistically rejected,
we cannot reject a third, original, condition. We also find some empirical evidence
for the LCS principle, as well as both increasing and constant returns to scale for
two-digit US manufacturing industries. The results highlight the importance of
imperfect competition for understanding aggregate growth, investment and em-
ployment.
Keywords: Aggregation, Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle, returns to scale,
market power, markup, own-price elasticity.
JEL Classification: D21, D43.
∗ Corresponding author: BETA, UMR 7522 CNRS, Université de Strasbourg, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire, 67085
Strasbourg Cedex (France). Tel (+33) 368 852 190. Fax (+33) 368 852 071. Email: koebel@unistra.fr.
∗∗ BETA, UMR 7522 CNRS, Université de Strasbourg, and ZEW Mannheim.
This and the companion paper Koebel and Laisney (2014) constitute revisions of material that has been circulated
in the discussion paper Koebel and Laisney (2010). We would like to thank Rabah Amir, Bernd Fitzenberger,
Kevin Fox, Phu Nguyen-Van, Stéphane Robin and the participants of seminars in Berlin, Cergy, Dijon, Frankfurt
aM, Hannover, Konstanz, Leuven, Magdeburg, Milano, Nancy and Paris for their helpful comments. Bertrand
Koebel thanks ZEW for its hospitality. We are also indebted to the editor and two anonymous referees for useful
comments on a previous version.
1
1. Introduction
A large literature on Cournot competition is devoted to two theoretical diﬃculties:
an equilibrium may not exist; even if it exists, comparative statics at the Cournot
equilibrium is nonmonotone and heterogeneous over competing firms. Even the direction
of the impact of a change in input prices on individual output supply and input demand
is ambiguous. With imperfect competition, and focusing on the price of energy, say,
some energy intensive firms will suﬀer from an increase in energy price and reduce their
input and output levels, whereas more eﬃcient competitors will increase their market
share and possibly even increase their overall use of energy. However, from an economic
viewpoint, the way a specific firm reacts to a change in an input price may not be of
primary interest. More relevant is how the whole industry copes with the price shock.
When a government increases a value added tax rate or lowers tariﬀs (for instance) it
is mainly interested in the change in the industry price and the possible reduction in
production and employment in that industry, but not in how each company within the
industry adjusts its price, production and employment levels.
In a companion paper (Koebel and Laisney, 2014) we show that the ambiguity at the
firm level is theoretically resolved if we study aggregate output supply and aggregate
input demand. The required conditions on the structure of the economy, in terms of firm
heterogeneity and returns to scale, are rather weak. They ensure that the Le Chatelier-
Samuelson (LCS) principle is likely to be satisfied at the aggregate Cournot equilibrium:
an increase in input prices entails a reduction in aggregate input demands.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first empirical investigation of two
well-known suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium, derived
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by Novshek (1985) and by Amir (1996). Surprisingly, both theoretical conditions are
empirically rejected. However, a further existence condition derived and discussed in
Koebel and Laisney (2014), is not rejected. Our paper also tackles the second problem
of indeterminacy of firm level comparative statics and investigates the empirical validity
of the LCS principle when competition is imperfect.
In order to produce an empirical decomposition of the impact of input price changes
on input demands into an aggregate substitution eﬀect and an expansion eﬀect, it is
necessary to propose an adequate empirical specification compatible with firm hetero-
geneity. Instead of relying on a representative firm setup, which may imply estimation
biases when firms are heterogeneous, we proceed to aggregation using the stochastic
aggregation theory developed by Lewbel (1996) and Koebel (2002). The aggregate cost
function is defined as the conditional expectation of the summed microeconomic cost
functions, given the available aggregate information. In this context, the aggregate cost
function does not generally inherit the properties of the microeconomic cost functions.
However, in this paper we show that it is possible to derive the conditional expectation
of the input demand system from the cost function by amending Shephard’s lemma, and
to identify the conditional expectation of the substitution and expansion eﬀects using
aggregate data only. We show that there are biases linked with the representative firm
specification, we characterise them, provide a parametric way to deal with them and
propose a simple test for the validity of the representative firm model.
There is a further methodological focus in this paper: we present a method for deal-
ing with empirical issues raised by the adjustment of inputs in the long run, in the
context of increasing or decreasing returns to scale. When the rate of returns and the
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type of competition on the output market are a priori unknown, empirical contributions
(reviewed by Bresnahan, 1989) have often appended a pricing rule — compatible with
both perfect and imperfect competition — to the cost and input demand system. How-
ever, most of these studies do not derive the optimal output level, nor do they report
how output and its price react to input price changes. This shortcoming is surprising
because, when output is optimally chosen by the production unit, output-restricted elas-
ticities are only of limited interest for deriving policy implications. A further objective
of this paper is thus to estimate elasticities that are not restricted by an output level
artificially held constant. Since a closed form solution for the optimal output level can
seldom be obtained from the price-margin equation, we rely on the implicit function
theorem for deriving these elasticities empirically. This method has been developed and
applied by Kulatilaka (1987) to model the adjustment of capital to its optimal long run
level. We extend his method by deriving moment conditions which are consistent with
the theoretical model and identify the substitution and expansion eﬀects of input price
changes. This method allows us to derive consistent estimates of the substitution and
the expansion matrices and to test the validity of the LCS principle in the aggregate.
The empirical application relies on a panel for 18 two-digit US manufacturing indus-
tries over the period 1949 to 2001 (but some of the results have been confirmed with the
more disaggregated NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database for 462 industries).
Our model is essentially static, because with yearly data available (as in most empirical
studies on imperfect competition), it is hardly possible to identify dynamic interactions
in price and quantity setting which occur within few weeks. Games implying conjectural
variations are usually estimated using experimental data (in which strategic interactions
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occur within minutes). A static model is appropriate to estimate the long-run relation-
ships we are interested in. We obtain several results relative to the rate of returns to
scale, the markup, the short and long run adjustment of input demand to input price
change, and the impact of input price changes on output adjustment and inflation. The
empirical findings confirm the validity of the LCS principle. Whether returns to scale are
increasing or not in U.S. manufacturing industries is an important but controversial em-
pirical issue. Whereas many researchers have argued for the increasing returns to scale
hypothesis (Hall, 1988, Diewert and Fox, 2008), just as many researchers have found
evidence for the contrary (Burnside, 1996, Bartelsman, 1995, Basu and Fernald, 1997).
We find evidence for both increasing and constant returns to scale across industries and
time.
The next section outlines the microeconomic model and derives the LCS principle
at the aggregate level, when the output market is imperfectly competitive. Section
3 presents the aggregate statistical model compatible with available aggregate data.
Section 4 sets up the empirical model specification and highlights how it departs from
usual models of producer behavior. The empirical results are described in Section 5,
and Section 6 concludes.
2. Existence of Cournot equilibrium and aggregate
comparative statics
Let  : ( ) 7→  ( ) denote the inverse product demand function for a good produced
in some sector of the economy. The aggregate output level  is the sum of firm’s 
output level  and the aggregate output of all its competitors, − Vector  denotes
exogenous explanatory variables shifting output demand (as the country’s population,
5
the unemployment rate, the level of value added tax and so on). We assume that each
individual firm is profit maximizing:
 ( − ) = max { ( + − )  −  ( )}  (1)
The cost of producing output  at input prices   ( )  corresponds to the value
of  input demands ∗:  ( ) = >∗ ( )  Let  ( − ) denote the optimal
solution to (1): this represents the output supply correspondence. For a given level of
− the input demand correspondence  ( − ) is nonincreasing in  (see Koebel
and Laisney, 2014). The aggregate production level of competitors represents a negative
externality for firm  At the Nash equilibrium, − is endogenous and is written as
 − ( )  Substituting  − into  and  yields the equilibrium supply and demand
correspondences  ( ) and  ( )  respectively, and these are not monotone in 
Let us also define the aggregate input demand and supply quantities as follows:
∗
³
 {}=1
´
≡
X
=1
∗ ( ) 
 ( ) ≡
X
=1
 ( )  and   ( ) ≡
X
=1
 ( ) 
Superscript  denotes the quantities at the Cournot-Nash-equilibrium.
Novshek (1985) illustrated that a Cournot equilibrium does not always exist (for a
given value of ). He also showed that a suﬃcient condition for its existence is that
the marginal revenue of each firm is decreasing in the rivals’ production level. This
condition can be stated as:

 ( + − ) + 
2
 2 ( + − ) ≤ 0 (2)
for any value of  − Novshek shows that this can equivalently be written as

 ( ) + 
2
 2 ( ) ≤ 0 (3)
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for any  This inequality depends on aggregate data only and implies that condition
(2) is fulfilled for any firm.
Another suﬃcient condition for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium was proposed
by Amir (1996, Theorem 3.1): if
 ( ) 
2
 2 ( )−
∙ 
 ( )
¸2
≤ 0 (4)
for any  , then a Cournot equilibrium exists. Inequalities (3) and (4) are not nested,
despite the fact that they involve the same partial derivatives: Amir (2005, p.4) gives an
example of a function satisfying (2) but not (4), and of another function for which (4)
is true but not (2). The strength of these existence results is that they are independent
on the type of firms’ cost functions. The generality of this requirement, however, is also
responsible for the severity of the conditions (4) and (3), and we are tempted to restrict
somewhat the cost function specification in order to gain less restrictive conditions on
the marginal revenue.
This road has been followed in the companion paper, Koebel and Laisney (2014)
who showed that a Cournot equilibrium exists if the cost functions are such that no
firm chooses an optimal level of output greater than some value    An aggregate
suﬃcient condition implying that (2) is satisfied for any value of  compatible with a
value H of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration, provided that the inverse
demand function is convex, is given by

 ( ) +
√
H 
2
 2 ( ) ≤ 0 (5)
Condition (5) is weaker than condition (3): when output demand is concave, both
inequalities (3) and (5) are satisfied. However, when output demand is convex, for
given values of ( ), condition (5) puts less weight on the positive term than Novshek’s
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condition, and it turns out that (5) may be valid when (3) is not.
One aim of the paper is to empirically test the validity of the nonnested existence
conditions (3), (4) and (5). These conditions can be tested using only aggregate data
at the level of the industry. A second reason for focusing on condition (5) is that it
also ensures monotone comparative statics in the aggregate. Koebel and Laisney (2014,
Corollary 1) show that if (5) is satisfied, then

> ( ) ≤
∗
>
³
 {}=1
´
≤ 0 (6)
 
 ( ) ≤ 0 (7)
if firms are not "too" heterogenous in their technologies (the precise meaning of "too"
is given in their Corollary 1). These results complete those obtained in the context of
perfect competition by Heiner (1982) and Braulke (1984).
3. Aggregation when the distribution of market
shares is unobserved
We now include a variable  denoting time as an argument of the cost and demand
functions. We explicitly derive the aggregate relationships from the disaggregate ones
and show that they depend upon the distribution of market shares (and how it changes
with   and ). We also discuss identification of the eﬀect of unobserved shifts in
market shares on the aggregate cost and demand functions.
3.1 Aggregate cost and input demand functions
Whereas it is natural to define total cost at the level of an industry by  =P=1>
the total cost function is given by  ( 1       ) = P=1  (  ) and depends
upon the whole distribution of output within the industry, a piece of information which
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is diﬃcult to obtain and not always possible to consider explicitly. In order to set up
an aggregate model, we follow Lewbel (1996) and Koebel (2002) and reparameterize
(1     ) =  in terms of the market shares  = (1      )  Then, it is al-
ways possible to define the aggregate cost and demand functions as the conditional
expectations of the true but unobserved functions:
C (  ) = E [ (  ) |  ]  (8)
X∗ (  ) = E [∗ (  ) |  ]  (9)
The conditional expectation is taken with respect to the conditional density of market
shares  (|  ). The randomness of  given (  ) results from the (unobserved)
heterogeneity of firms’ technologies.
The properties of the aggregate cost and input demand functions have been studied
by Lewbel (1996) and Koebel (2002) who show that microeconomic properties are not
necessarily inherited in the aggregate. Indeed, comparative statics for the aggregate
demands depend on the way the distribution of market shares is shifted by changes in
(  ):
C
 (  ) = E
∙
 (  ) |  
¸
+
Z
 (  )  (|  )  (10)
C
 (  ) = E
∙
 (  ) |  
¸
+
Z
 (  )  (|  )  (11)
Whereas the first terms of the right hand side of the equalities denote the expected
input demand for (10) and marginal cost for (11), the last terms are redistribution eﬀects
corresponding to shifts in the distribution of market shares following changes in  and
 These terms correspond to aggregation biases and can be denoted by  (  )
and  (  ), respectively. Note, however, that the adding up property is inherited
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in the aggregate in the sense that C (  ) = >X∗ (  )  through linearity of the
expectation operator.
Without disaggregate data on the distribution of market shares, it is diﬃcult to iden-
tify both the expected value of the derivatives of  w.r.t.  and  and the redistribution
eﬀect separately. For instance, if  is homogeneous of degree zero in  both terms of
decomposition (10) are homogenous of degree zero. How is it possible in this context
to disentangle both terms without using data specific to the distribution  and ?
Economic theory provides structure identifying (10). Indeed, by Shephard’s lemma,
the first term on the right hand side of equality (10) corresponds to aggregate input
demands:
E
∙
 (  ) |  
¸
= E [∗ (  ) |  ] = X∗ (  )  (12)
a term which can be estimated when data on inputs is available. Thus it is possible to
identify the aggregation biases residually, as the diﬀerence C −X∗. Note that in
this way identification is achieved even in the case where  is homogeneous of degree
zero in 
Proposition 1. Under the assumption that each firm is cost minimizing, and that
the aggregate conditional mean cost function C and all the partial derivatives C
are identified, the aggregation biases  are identified.
Corollary 1. The aggregate cost function C
(i) is homogeneous of degree one in  iﬀ for any (  )
> (  ) = 0 (13)
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(ii) satisfies Shephards’ lemma in the sense that C = X∗ iﬀ for any (  )
 (  ) = 0 (14)
This corollary is a direct consequence of relationships (10) and (12). Function C is
homogeneous of degree one in  iﬀ >C = C (  ) = >X∗ (  ) and so the
claim of Corollary 1(i) directly follows from (10). Corollary 1(ii) follows from (10) and
(12).
3.2 Identification of the markup, marginal cost and aggregation
biases
We first derive the aggregate markup pricing relationship and discuss how it relates to
the exact aggregation literature. Then we study conditions under which the aggregation
bias in the price margin relationship is identified.
The first order condition for profit maximization for firm  is given by:
+   =

 (  )  (15)
At the industry level with  firms, aggregate output is given by  = P=1  and
satisfies  = P=1 . Aggregating (15) over firms involves a weighted sum with
market shares as weights and yields:
+
X
=1

 

 =
X
=1


 (  )
  (16)
Two approaches lead to a relationship that can be estimated with aggregate data.
The first one assumes that microeconomic relationships exhibit properties leading to
simplifications in equation (16). When all firms have the same inverse demand elasticity
and the same marginal cost function  ( )  ≡  (), then (16) can be written in
terms of aggregate variables only. Such an assumption, however, is incompatible with
our purpose of estimating returns to scale without unwarranted restrictions.
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The second approximate aggregation approach, developed by Lewbel (1996), explic-
itly defines aggregate functions as conditional expectations of the disaggregate relation-
ships, thereby avoiding restrictions on individual technologies. Doing this, we obtain
from (16):
+   E
" X
=1
2|  
#
= E
" X
=1


 (  )
 |  
#

So, the conditional expectation of the marginal revenue depends upon
H (  ) ≡ E
" X
=1
2|  
#

which corresponds to the conditional expectation of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of
industry concentration. Using (11), we can rewrite this equation as:
+H (  )  =
C
 (  )−
Z
 (  )  (|  )  (17)
The main advantage of the aggregate specification (17) is that it is compatible with the
microeconomic specification (15). If a solution  to the system (15) exists, then the
existence of a solution to (17) is also ensured, because in this case the expectations are
conditional on  =P  (  )  the aggregate Nash outcome. If the solution to (17)
in  is unique then   (  ) = P  (  ). If (17) exhibits multiple solutions in
 , however, one of them only corresponds to P  (  ) 
Note that specification (17) obtained by aggregating (15) looks similar to the usual
microeconomic specifications for which  + H  is interpreted as the marginal
revenue as perceived by the firm: H = 1 corresponds to a cartel, H = 1 to a
(symmetric) Cournot oligopoly and H = 0 to perfect competition. See Bresnahan
(1989) and Reiss and Wolak (2007) for a survey of this literature. All terms of (17) are
identified when data on the Herfindahl index is available:  and  are identified from
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estimating an inverse demand function, H is identified as the conditional expectation of
the Herfindahl index; and C is identified from the estimation of the cost function,
and so the aggregation bias  (  ) can be computed residually. Without such
information, however, it seems diﬃcult to identify H separately from   Bresnahan
(1982) and Lau (1982) discussed the conditions under which a constant parameterH can
be uniquely identified under the assumption that a representative firm exists ( ≡ 0).
Lau’s result can be extended to our framework:
Proposition 2. Under the above assumptions,
(i) the functions H and  are nonparametrically identifiable iﬀ the inverse demand
function  is not such that  ( ) =  ( ) () +  ( ) in the case where  is a scalar,
or  ( ) = P ( ()) in the case where  is a vector, which means that  is weakly
separable in ;
(ii) for parameterized shifts in the distribution of market shares, the model is identified
under broader circumstances than those mentioned in (i).
Proposition 2(i), proven in Appendix A for the sake of completeness, extends Lau’s
(1982) identification theorem in a context where H is not constant but a function of
(  )  The identifiability condition given in P2(i) can be relatively easily tested from
the estimation of an inverse demand function. When the null of separability of  in 
cannot be rejected, then by Proposition 2(i) H and  are not identifiable, unless one
follows the hint given in P2(ii) and specifies adequate functional forms for H and  
The main diﬀerence between Lau’s and our result is that in our case, information on
costs is available and this allows identifying functions C and C . Supplementing
cost data to the analysis allows us to overcome Lau’s identification problem concern-
13
ing the marginal cost function and to extend his result to the problem of identifying
the aggregation bias. Indeed, aggregate cost and marginal cost depend upon the way
aggregate output is distributed over firms, and this information, which was missing in
the Bresnahan-Lau approach, allows identifying both the average market power of an
industry and the aggregation bias.
For instance, when the firms’ market shares are constant,  = 0 and (17) allows
to link the unobserved marginal cost function  to the estimable marginal cost
function C since then (see equation (11)):
C
 (  ) = E
∙
 (  ) |  
¸

Thus the estimation of the conditional mean cost function C is informative about the
otherwise unobserved aggregate marginal cost and this information allows to identify
the average market power H as the ratio between C −  and  
In the case where  and H are constant, (17) can be rewritten as
+H  + =
C
 (  ) 
When C is observed, it is possible to identify  and H iﬀ the "regressors" 
and   are not proportional, which is the case iﬀ  ( ) 6=  ()  This example
illustrates that, with more information on costs, identification is achieved under broader
circumstances than those given in Proposition 2(i).
3.3 Toward the specification of aggregate cost and input
demand functions
From equation (8) it is clear that most microeconomic properties of  are lost in the
aggregate if the conditional distribution of market shares depends upon (  ). How
should we specify the aggregate model in this case? For answering this question, let us
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write
C (  ) =
Z
 (  )  (|  ) 
=
Z
 (  )  ()  +
Z
 (  ) ( (|  )−  ()) 
≡ C0 (  ) +C1 (  )  (18)
where  () denotes the marginal (joint) density of market shares. This decomposition
shows that the aggregate cost function can always be additively decomposed into a
function C0 satisfying some microeconomic properties (especially linear homogeneity in
) and a perturbation functionC1 which depends on the gap between the conditional and
marginal distribution of the market shares. This decomposition is useful for the empirical
specification of the cost function. C1 vanishes under Lewbel’s (1996) independence
assumption,  (|  ) =  (), and only a well behaved aggregate cost function C0
remains.
The microeconomic properties of C0 are actually helpful for identifying C1 : any
departure of C from linear homogeneity, Shephard’s lemma and concavity in prices can
be attributed to distributional shifts captured by C1. However, in most cases, only parts
of this function can be identified separately from C0.1 This is not really a problem, since
we are not interested in identifying C1 but in modelling the aggregate cost function and
its partial derivatives.
According to Corollary 1(ii), the input demand system X∗ cannot be obtained from C
by applying Shephard’s lemma. From equations (9) and (10), however, we know that:
X∗ (  ) = C (  )− (  )  (19)
1 Consider for instance C0 = > + > ( +)  which is linearly homogeneous in  and C1 = 0 + > ++ Then the parameters  and  cannot be separately identified in the expression of the aggregate cost function
C0 +C1
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which can be plugged into (23). Although the aggregate cost function loses most micro-
economic properties, the adding-up property is still satisfied by C, and this allows us to
relate the aggregation bias  on input demands to function C1 Indeed,
C (  ) = >X∗ (  )
⇔ C0 (  ) +C1 (  ) = >C (  )− 
> (  )
⇔ > (  ) = >C1 (  )−C1 (  )  (20)
where the last line follows from the definition of C and linear homogeneity of C0 in .
4. Empirical specification
In the empirical application, we use a panel of  industries indexed by  = 1     
observed over  time periods indexed by  = 1      We first present the model speci-
fication, and then discuss the empirical content of the aggregate LCS decomposition.
4.1 The empirical model
The whole model consists of a system with a price setting rule, an inverse output demand
function, five input demand equations and a cost function:
1 +H (  )  ln  ln ( ) =
1

µC
 (  )− (  )
¶
+  (21)
 =  ( ) +  (22)
 = X∗ (  ) +  (23)
 = C (  ) +  (24)
Let  ≡ ¡    ¢>  The value of  solving equation (21) given    
and  will depend on   and thus we cannot assume mean independence between
 and (  )  but we assume that E [| ] = 0. Several assumptions on
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E
£>| ¤ compatible with diﬀerent forms of heteroskedasticity and correlation over
   and  are considered. In order to be able to identify the diﬀerent parameters
of (21), notably the parameters of  and C we estimate it jointly with the
inverse output demand (22), the set of input demand functions (23) and the cost func-
tion (24). As  = > and  = > the cost function does not add any new
information not already entailed in the input demands when the whole system is esti-
mated in levels. However, when estimation is in first diﬀerences this no longer holds,
because for any given  and  the error terms  − −1 and  − −1 are linearly
independent when  is not proportional to −1 We now detail the specification of
the functions appearing in the system (21)-(24).
4.1.1 Inverse output demand
Several variables are candidates for inclusion in the output demand shifting vector  in
the expression of  ( )  Most of them are macroeconomic variables like GDP, total
population, unemployed rate, government expenditures, exports and imports, interest
rate or GDP inflation rate. Specifying  explicitly may yield a wrong specification of
the inverse demand function, so we prefer instead including unobserved time specific
variables  as well as a time trend  in (25) for representing omitted  variables. We
also introduce industry-specific indicators , and assume that
 ( ) = exp
µ
 ln + 12  (ln)
2 +   ln +  + 
¶
 (25)
where  = (      )> is a vector of three parameters and  =
¡  ¢. With this
specification,  is separable in  iﬀ   = 0 (see Proposition 2(i)).2 There are + +2
2 Admittedly, allowing all  parameters to vary with  could be attractive, but we cannot allow this level of generality
for data reasons. A limited way to test for separability would be to test the constancy of the  over time. It is limited
in the sense that nonrejection leads to nonrejection of separability, but not conversely, as the parameters could move
proportionately.
17
free parameters in (25).
4.1.2 Aggregate cost function and input demands
We specify the aggregation bias  as:
 (  ) ≡ 1
³
 + > ln +   ln + 
´
  = 1      (26)
which involves  + 3 free -parameters, with  the number of inputs. We refrain from
a richer specification, e.g. including interaction terms, because (i) none of the 
is observed, and (ii) this simple introduction of a loglinear bias term in our translog
specification already results in a considerable increase in complexity. The advantage of
introducing the factor 1 is that C1 (  ) takes the simple form (see equation (20)):
C1 (  ) =  + >ln ln +  ln + +  (  ) 
where function  is homogeneous of degree one in  Remember (footnote 1) that it is not
always possible to separately identify  fromC0 so for simplicity, we set  (  ) ≡ >.
The parameters  of C1 are linked to the -parameters of  by
 = −
X
=1
 −
X
=1
>   ln = −
X
=1
   = −
X
=1
    = −
X
=1
 
Thus, only  free parameters  enter C1 in addition of those appearing in . Ac-
cording to Corollary 1, the representative firm assumption will be tested using estimates
of the  and  and the restrictions (13) and (14). Note that departure of C from
linear homogeneity in  can be measured by:
C− >C = C1 − 
>C1
 =  + 
>
ln ln +  ln + − > ln (27)
The more traditional part of the cost function, C0 is specified as a translog functional
form, a second order approximation of a general cost function in terms of the logs of
its arguments. This specification is flexible in (  ), so that both increasing and
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decreasing returns to scale are a priori possible:
C0 (  ) = exp
h
0 + > ln +  ln +  (28)
+
1
2
(ln)> ln + > ln ln + > (ln) 
+
1
2
  (ln )2 +   ln + 1
2
2
¸

where ln = (ln1     ln)>  The parameters 0     are industry specific,
hence the subscript  We know from (18) that function C0 is linearly homogenous in
 so the -parameters satisfy the usual restrictions:
>  = 1 > = 0 >  = >  = 0 (29)
where  denotes a -vector of ones. Matrix  is symmetric. There are  ( + 2) +
 ( + 3) 2 + 1 free -parameters involved in (28).
Finally, the aggregation bias aﬀecting the aggregate marginal cost is specified as
 (  ) ≡  + > ln +   ln +   (30)
which includes  +3 further parameters, and can be seen as a first order approximation
in terms of ln ln and .
4.1.3 Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) index
Unfortunately, the HH-index is not available in our data and we have to estimate it
together with the other parameters of the model. We restrict it to lie in [0; 05], a
plausible restriction for the two digit level of aggregation (at the four digit level the
HH is rarely above 0.5 and it does not increase at a higher level of aggregation). We
first experimented with the logistic c.d.f. halved. However, this has the drawback
that the lower and upper bounds are reached only at infinity, which created numerical
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convergence problems. We thus consider the following specification:
H (  ) =
h
cos
³
0 + > ln +  ln + 
´
+ 1
i
4 (31)
which leads to similar results for the other parameters of the model, but more stable
results for the HH-index.3 The various  represent parameters to be estimated, they
include industry specific fixed eﬀects 0 to allow for industry diﬀerences in the HH-
index of concentration. For estimation, (30) and (31) are substituted into equation
(21).
4.2 Empirical expansion and substitution matrices
Our purpose is to identify the terms of the aggregate LCS decomposition:

> (  ) =
∗
>
µ

n

o
=1  
¶
+
X
=1
∗

³
   
´ 
> (  )  (32)
which was obtained from the theoretical relationship
 (  ) = ∗
µ

n

o
=1  
¶
=
X
=1
∗
³
   
´

See Koebel and Laisney (2014) for details. When output quantities are optimally al-
located, they are driven by (  )  i.e.  =  (  ) and  =   (  ), and the
distribution of market shares becomes endogenous:  =  (  ) and we can write:4
 (  ) = ∗
³
  (  )  (  )  
´
= X∗
³
   (  )  
´
+   (33)
The last equality follows from (9) when  =   . The term  denotes a random
aggregation error satisfying E
£ |  ¤ = 0. Keeping  fixed, this equation implies
that (omitting the arguments of  ):

> (  ) =
X∗
>
³
    
´
+
X∗

³
    
´  
> (  )  (34)
3 The potential drawback of cyclicity of the cosine function is not too important here, since over the range of values of
the argument of the cosine for each industry, cos turns out to be bijective for most industries (15 out of 18).
4 The heterogeneity in market shares is mainly driven by the heterogeneity in the cost functions, and becomes endoge-
nous at the Nash equilibrium.
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All terms involved in this expression can be obtained from the estimation of function
X∗ and from the aggregate first order condition (17).5 Applying the implicit function
theorem to (17) yields:
 
> (  ) =
2C
  −

 − 


H

(1 +H)  + 


H
 + H
2
 2 −
2C
 2 +


 (35)
This expression is then replaced into (34) in order to obtain matrix >
4.3 Econometric issues
We now explain how we propose to deal with the endogeneity of aggregate output in
our input demand system. The observed input quantities are related to the demand
functions by:
 = E [|  ] + 
=  (  ) + 
= X∗
³
   (  )  
´
+ 
= X∗
³
  −  
´
+  (36)
All equalities are equivalent representations of the relation of interest. The first equal-
ity corresponds to the definition of the conditional mean. The second equality follows
from the hypothesis that the conditional means of input quantities (given   )
correspond to aggregate Nash equilibrium input demands  . The random term 
represents random deviations between observations and Nash equilibrium. The third
equality follows from (33), with the random term  ≡  + . The fourth equality is
obtained because observed aggregate output is related to the Nash equilibrium output
by  =   + . Unfortunately, these equations are not useful as such for parameter
5 In general, there will be no one to one correspondence between the substitution and expansion matrices of (32) and
(34), but this seems to be the best approximation we can think of.
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estimation: the second equation does not allow to disentangle substitution and expan-
sion eﬀects; the third equality is useless, because   is not known; the fourth equality
is not much more helpful because the error term  is not observed. Instead of that,
we have to rely upon (23). These relationships clarify that the random term  in our
regression (23) is a nonlinear function of . Comparing (23) and (36) it turns out
that:
 = X∗
³
    
´
−X∗
³
   +  
´
+  (37)
Since
E
h
|  
i
= E
h

³
  (  ) + 
´
|  
i
= E
h
|  
i

it turns out, by (37), that  is not a valid instrument. Valid instruments can be found
using the fact that
E [|  ] = X∗
³
   (  )  
´
 (38)
These conditional moments justify the use of the unconditional moments E
h

i
= 0
with instruments  =  (  ), and  denoting a -vector of arbitrary square
integrable functions of (  ).
In order to avoid spurious regression problems linked with nonstationarity, we esti-
mate the cost and input demand equations in first diﬀerences. Only the price markup
relationship (22) is considered in level as both the markup and the HH-index should be
stationary.
For each industry we have 50 periods, so the incidental parameter problem connected
with the industry-specific fixed eﬀects does not arise here.6 Thus, the ∗ first year
observations are lost, where ∗ =  + 3 denotes the number of regressions in the sys-
6 Results obtained with regressions in levels or with an AR(1) specification for the error terms are available in Koebel
and Laisney (2010). The results discussed here correspond to the statistically preferred specification.
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tem (21)-(24). The vector of error terms is denoted by ∆ ≡ ¡ ∆∆∆¢
with ∆ =  − −1 for  =  and the moment conditions are given by
E
h
∆>−1
i
= 0 where  denotes the instruments and comprises  ln  ln,
(ln)2  as well as  industry and  − 2 period indicators. The discussion lead-
ing to Proposition 3 suggests that E
h
−1>−1
i
= 0 and so the moment conditions
E
h
∆>−1
i
= 0 are fulfilled if E
h
>−1
i
= 0.
The same instruments are used for all GMM estimators and all equations. The whole
system comprises 291 parameters to be estimated on the basis of  ( − 1)∗ = 7488
observations. So there are 99× 8 = 792 orthogonality conditions imposed for parameter
identification. The residual variance matrix is obtained from the residuals of a first stage
regression in which the weighting matrix was set to the identity.
5. Empirical results
The data we use are described in Appendix B. They are used also by Diewert and Fox
(2008) in a study on imperfect competition. Firm data can also be informative for
this kind of study (see Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2013), but as they are typically not
exhaustive, they are not useful for our purpose of investigating aggregate output and
input demand. A further drawback of micro data for our purposes is the usual lack of
reliable price information. Data for the same level of aggregation are also used by Hall
(1988), Roeger (1995), Oliveira Martins et al. (1996), Morrison (1999) and others. We
present the empirical results in five groups;7 first, those concerning the (inverse) output
demand function; second, those relative to the rate of return to scale and markups;
third, the test results on the representative firm; fourth, all results describing shifts at
7 The results were obtained with TSP 5.1.
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given aggregate output, and fifth, results corresponding to the total impact of input
price changes on input demand and output supply (which includes general equilibrium
eﬀects).
5.1 The inverse demand function
Table 1 reports estimates of the inverse output demand function (22). The first line
of results concerns the estimates when all ∗ regressions are simultaneously run. The
second one reports estimates obtained for the single regression (22).
The estimated values of the parameters exhibit no contradiction between the two
estimation methods: the significant coeﬃcients in the single equation are close to the
system estimates. Our preferred specification is the system of equations because it
is more eﬃcient and enables identification of the markup, the Hirschman-Herfindahl
function H and the aggregation biases (see Proposition 2). However, we also report the
single estimation estimates, because in many cases only data on output quantity and
output prices are available to researchers.8
The sensitivity of output price to output quantity is found to be quite important
with both estimation methods: the inverse demand elasticity with respect to output,
 (; )  is significantly diﬀerent from zero and large in absolute value. We tested for
industry specific heterogeneity in the elasticities by including heterogeneous parameters
 for each industry in the inverse demand specification (25). The test did not reject
the homogeneity hypothesis ( =  ). Separability in , however, is strongly rejected
(as   is significantly diﬀerent from zero in the system). The overidentification test
does not reject the instruments’ validity, which is conform to our discussion below (38).
8 But note that we use cost information in the instrumentation. The necessity of instrumentation is documented by
the fact that nonlinear least squares estimation yields a median value of  (; ) of −0202 which is strikingly diﬀerent
from the GMM results of Table 1.
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Table 1: GMM estimates for the inverse output demand
Estimation method       (; )   2 2 OIT
System −1258
(−130)
−0205
(−45)
0012
(50) −0571(−96) −3865(−96) 6141(83) 99(495)
Single equation −1091
(−48)
−0210
(−18)
0006
(10) −0593(−38) −3660(−38) 5998(30) 29(27)
Columns 5 to 7 report the median value of the corresponding statistic over all observations as well as the
median Student statistic in parentheses. Bold entries highlight significant results at the 5% level. The last
column reports the p-value of the overidentification test and the number of degrees of freedom. The number of
instruments is 99 in the single regression (for 72 parameters), and 8x99 for the system (with 297 parameters).
Turning to the suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium, in all
cases, the inverse output demand is decreasing and 2 2 is found to be statistically
significant and positive. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 1 suggest that  +  2 2 is
slightly positive. Indeed it turns out to be significantly positive at the 5% level for the
bulk of the observations for the system, so that Novshek’s suﬃcient condition is rejected
(for the single equation, however, it is insignificant for most observations). Inference
here and in the sequel concerns functions of both the estimated coeﬃcients (together
with their asymptotic normal distribution) and observed regressors and uses the delta
method. Whereas Amir’s suﬃcient condition for the existence of a Cournot equilibrium,
(4), is rejected (at the 5% threshold) for 79% of the observations, Novshek’s condition
is rejected in 94% of the cases. In contrast, the weaker aggregate condition (5), which
also ensures existence of the Cournot equilibrium, is numerically satisfied for values of
the HH index H below 0.66.9
5.2 Rate of return to scale, markup and industry concentration
The magnitude of returns to scale plays an important role in our context. With increas-
ing returns to scale (IRS) perfect competition is not viable, as profits would be negative,
and this justifies our focus on imperfect competition. The quartiles (over years and in-
9 Amir and Novshek’s existence conditions are also rejected with the more disaggregated NBER data for 462 manu-
facturing industries.
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dustries) of the estimated values of the rate of return to scale and markup are reported
in Table 2. The overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at the 1% threshold. We
find evidence for IRS, since most estimates of  (C  ) are smaller than one and the IRS
hypothesis cannot be rejected for 40% of the observations. There is also a group of
observations (about 46%) compatible with the assumption of constant returns to scale.
Our estimated rate of returns to scale are often lower than those reported by Diewert
and Fox (2009), due possibly to fewer restrictions imposed on our cost function (as we
do not assume neutral technological change). However, our results are close for the
following eight industries: SIC No 22, 23, 25, 26, 30, 24, 35 and 38.10 The results also
confirm the existence of markup pricing (the median value of  (C ) is 1.15), and
the markup is significantly greater than one for 39% of the observations.
Table 2 also reports the 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 quantiles of the estimated HH-index of
concentration and their t-values. The median value of the estimated HH-index is 0.26
and it is significantly diﬀerent from zero for 41% of the observations. If we integrate
this estimated value of H into our formulation (5) of the existence of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, we cannot reject the existence assumption. This empirical finding provides
empirical support for Proposition 2 in Koebel and Laisney (2014).
Table 3 reports the correlations (over 18 industries) between the average values (over
time) of diﬀerent measures of imperfect competition, H  (C  )   (C )   (  ) 
 , based on the system estimates with C1 6= 0 Variables  and  correspond to
two rates of profit (a ratio between profit and sales) whose precise definition is given in
Appendix B. These correlations suggest that the implicit HH-index, H, is not strongly
correlated with other indicators of imperfect competition as the rate of returns to scale,
10 See Table B1 in Appendix B for the industry names.
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Table 2: GMM estimates of the rate of return to scale, markup, and H
C1 6= 0 C1 ≡ 0
Quartile  (C; )  (C ) H OIT  (C; )  (C ) H OIT
0.25 079
(−31) 102(03) 008(06) 086(−14) 094(−09) 007(04)
0.50 091
(−14) 115(16) 026(17) 0.99 098(−02) 106(04) 017(09) 0.11
0.75 103
(06) 132(31) 045(35) 106(10) 117(13) 029(16)
The table reports the 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 quantiles (over the ( −1) = 936 observations) of the estimated
values of  (  ),  ( ) and H. The t-statistics for the hypotheses  (  ) = 1 ,  ( ) = 1
and H = 0 appear in parentheses. The OIT column reports the p-value of the overidentification test.
Table 3: Correlation between diﬀerent estimated measures of imperfect competition
H  (C  )  (C )  (  ) 
 (C  ) −010
 (C ) −018 −066
 (  ) −016 −026 027
 011 043 000 −043
 006 051 −003 −026 086
The entries correspond to the empirical correlation between the estimated
values of the variables of the respective column and line. In a first stage, the
variables are averaged over time, then the correlation is calculated over the
18 industries. The values used for  and  are those depicted in Figure
B3.
Table 4: Estimates of the aggregation biases
Bias      
 001
(11) −019(−50) 090(39) −013(−82) 188(105) 003(02)
The table reports the median value of the estimated aggregation bi-
ases, expressed in proportion of the corresponding input quantity. The
aggregation bias on marginal costs,  , is expressed as a proportion
of marginal cost. The t-statistic for the null that  = 0 appears in
parentheses.
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the markup, the output demand elasticity or the profit rate. In contrast,  (C  ) (column
3) is strongly negatively correlated with the markup and positively correlated with the
profit rate. These signs are due to the fact that
 (C  ) =  + 1 (C ) 
The high correlation between the rate of returns to scale and the markup is related to
the fact that industries with a low elasticity of cost with respect to output,  (C  ) 
need to price over their marginal cost to make nonnegative profit: if  (C  )  1 and
C =  then the profit is negative. The negative correlation between profit rate and
output demand elasticity is also conform to theory.
The null hypothesis of perfect competition is characterised by either H = 0 or
 (; ) = 0 in (21). While the first hypothesis is rejected for 41% of the observations,
the second one is rejected for all. Hence the null of perfect competition is rejected for
41% of the cases. Four industries (SIC No 27, 32, 33 and 35) are found to be in perfect
competition over the period. Four industries (SIC No 24, 25, 26 and 30) had strong
market power. For the other industries, we found evidence of market power over sub-
periods but not over the whole 52 years, a result which is consistent with the literature
on the cyclicality of the markup. Our estimates of the markups are lower than those
reported by Roeger (1995), who assumes that returns to scale are constant, but they
are broadly in line with those reported by Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) and Diewert
and Fox (2008).
5.3 Test of the representative firm assumption
As discussed in Sections 3 and 4, the representative firm model is obtained for C1 (  )
homogeneous of degree one in  which is the case iﬀ expression (27) is identically 0,
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but this hypothesis is statistically rejected at the 1% threshold.
A more restrictive version of the representative firm hypothesis imposes that 1 = 0.
This restriction yields the classical translog specification. Table 2 (right panel) shows
that this restriction yields estimates that are more compatible with the assumption of
perfect competion: the rate of returns and markups are closer to one, and the HH index
is closer to zero. This is due to the fact that the imposition 1 = 0 and  = 0 on the
specification corresponds to the exclusion of input and output reallocation eﬀects across
firms, which is statistically rejected. The value of the diﬀerent types of aggregation
biases, expressed in proportion of the corresponding input quantity (or marginal cost)
are reported in Table 4. It shows that the gap  (  ) between input demand
and the derivative of the cost function (see the discussion aroud Corollary 1) is often
significantly diﬀerent from zero and important. The distribution of output shares is
especially sensitive with respect to the price of intermediate services and energy. Our
interpretation is that firms’ outsourcing and merging decisions heavily depend on the
price of intermediate services: they choose to outsource their production if this price is
too low or to merge if it is too important.
Shephards’ lemma ( = 0) and the hypothesis that  is homogeneous of degree zero
in input prices (> = 0) are separately rejected for about 75% of the observations,
and these hypotheses are also rejected globally.
Although there is statistical evidence for the existence and significance of aggregation
biases, the orthogonality conditions of the tranlog model do not reject the translog spec-
ification at the 5% threshold. This shows that the unability to reject the orthogonality
conditions does not necessarily validate the specification (see Table 2).
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The bias aﬀecting marginal cost represents about 3% of marginal cost and is statis-
tically insignificant for 93% of the observations. This means that market share reallo-
cations (changes in the distribution of output shares) following an increase in aggregate
output  only marginally aﬀect aggregate cost. Let us consider a decomposition of re-
turns to scale, similar to the one in Basu and Fernald (1997, Equation (3)), and rewrite
the conditional expectation of (21) as
C


 =

 +

 H
 (; ) +  
The last term    represents the shift in the distribution of market shares triggered
by an increase in output. After replacing the diﬀerent terms of this last relationship
with the median value of their corresponding estimates, we obtain
091 ' 106− 015− 000
So, according to this decomposition, the cost reduction through output reallocation
eﬀect over firms is negligibly small (as the estimate of    is virtually nil).
We conclude this analysis by commenting the well-documented empirical contradic-
tion between results obtained from microeconomic and more aggregated data (see for
instance Basu and Fernald (1997)). The within industry reallocation eﬀect,   com-
parable to the one considered by Basu and Fernald (1997, p.265) is found to be small,
and consistent with the empirical results of Morrison-Paul and Siegel (1999). Instead,
we find that the impact of imperfect competition, H (; )  is important and
explains the gap between the rate of profit and returns to scale for many observations.
5.4 Substitution eﬀects
Table 5 reports the median value of the input demand elasticities over the 18 industries
and over all years. These elasticities are calculated for a given aggregate output level,
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and correspond to the aggregate substitution eﬀect. They give the input price sensitivity
of the aggregate input demand 
³
X∗ ;
´
and diﬀer somewhat from 
³
∗ ;
´
which
excludes shifts in the distribution of market shares (see Equation (33)).
Table 5: Elasticities for the aggregate substitution eﬀect

³
X∗ ;
´
X∗ X∗ X∗ X∗ X∗
 −019
(−16)
002
(15) 005(22) 002(25) 002(14)
 009
(09) −036(−96) 031(28) 008(29) −014(−10)
 −004
(−13)
003
(27) −043(−29) 004(41) 001(07)
 003
(05) 015(47) 001(01) −032(−115) 024(38)
 004
(03) 008(27) 005(07) 027(99) −008(−04)
 010
(06) 083(71) 056(22) 116(137) 066(31)
 0018
(29) −0011(−24) −0009(−09) −0017(−65) 0003(08)
The table reports the median value of the elasticities over all obser-
vations and the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses. Bold entries
highlight significant results at the 5% level. The subscripts k, l, e, m,
s refer to capital, labor, energy, materials, and services.
The upper panel of Table 5 gives the input price elasticities with the own-price elastic-
ities on the main diagonal. It can be seen that the own-price elasticities are nonpositive,
which is consistent with 
³
X∗ ;
´
≤ 0.
Most of the inputs are found to be substitutes, but substitution is rather limited
as all cross price elasticities are below 0.31 in absolute value. No inputs are found to
be significantly complements. Note that the signs of the elasticities of Table 5 are not
symmetric: energy and capital are substitutes for changes in the capital price but not
conversely. These findings are not contradictory: our aggregate model does not imply
that matrix X∗> is symmetric, because increases in energy and capital input prices
may have diﬀerent impacts on the distribution of market shares  (|  )  According
to (19), input demands can react asymmetrically to cross price variations due to shift
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in market shares induced by input price changes. This empirical finding could explain
why the literature reports a variety of contradictory results on the sign of this elasticity
(see for instance Frondel and Schmidt, 2002). Without aggregation bias, the signs of
 ¡X∗;¢ and  (X∗;) could not be diﬀerent.
The lower panel of Table 5 reports the impact of a marginal change in output 
³
X∗ ;
´
and the impact of time 
³
X∗ ; 
´
11 All conditional input demands are found to be
nondecreasing in the output level. Technological change is not neutral, but capital
intensive, labour saving and intermediate input saving.
5.5 Expansion eﬀect
Our modified version of Novshek’s assumption (5) is not rejected for 93% of the obser-
vations. So, we expect that the Cournot equilibrium exists and that the LCS principle
is satisfied at the aggregate level of the industry, in accordance with inequalities (6) and
(7).
However, one diﬃculty comes from the fact that the micoeconomic second order
condition for optimality of output is not always satisified empirically in the aggregate.
It turns out that the denominator of (35) was found to be significantly negative only
in 54% of the observations. The resulting lack of precision is inherited by the long run
elasticities.
Table 6 gives the median value of the estimates for the total impact of input prices
on equilibrium output quantity   and price  and input demands   The first
column shows that the median values of  ¡   ¢ are mostly negative, which conforms
with inequality (7), but they are not significantly diﬀerent from zero. There is also some
11 In fact,  X∗ ;  is a growth rate or a semi-elasticity defined as  X∗ ;  ≡  lnX∗.
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weak evidence for the inflationary impact of rising input prices as all  ¡  ¢ are found
to be nonnegative (but not significantly). This lack of precision is rather common in
applications using GMM. Here it is possibly due to the fact that the denominator of (35),
which was never found to be significantly positive, is not always significantly negative
(it is significantly negative for only 54% of the observations). A careful inspection of the
diﬀerent terms of the denominator shows that 2 2 is estimated to be significantly
negative (and so the marginal cost is found to be decreasing) in more than 30% of the
cases. This lack of precision also contaminates the estimates of 
³
X ;
´

For the median values reported in Table 5, the LCS principle is satisfied: we can
approximate the unrestricted demand elasticities by

³
X ;
´
'  (X∗ ;) +  (X∗ ; ) 
³
   
´
 (39)
When the median values of  ¡X∗ ; ¢ and  ¡   ¢ are positive and nonpositive, respec-
tively (Tables 5, line 7 and Table 6, column7), it turns out that  ¡X ;¢ ≤  ¡X∗ ;¢ 
However, the median values of the unrestricted elasticities reported in Table 6 do not
always satisfy the LCS principle due to sampling variation and violations of the sec-
ond order condition for optimality. Notice that the input demand functions X are
not homogeneous of degree zero in  (the column sums for the elasticities are not 0).
The only two significant elasticities,  ¡X∗ ;¢ and  (X∗;)  which concern labor and
intermediate material demands, have the expected negative sign and are much larger
than their short-run counterparts, in conformity with the version of the LCS principle
obtained by Koebel and Laisney (2014, Corollary 1).12
In summary, expansion, or price induced change in the output level, matters for
12 Finding significant results mainly on the diagonal of a matrix of price elasticities is a frequent result in demand
analysis (whether it concerns firms or households): own price eﬀects seem to be more easily identified than cross price
eﬀects.
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explaining changes in aggregate input demand. The mostly negative elasticities of Table
6 can be reconciled with the upward trending quantities reported on Figure B1: Table
5 showed that most of the growth in input demands is due to output growth. Output
growth in turn is hampered by input price increases, and rises with shifts in output
demand.
Table 6: Elasticities for total aggregate impact of input price changes
 (;)    X X X X X −010
(−04)
006
(04) −021(−06) −007(−04) −00(−01) −010(−03) −002(−01)
 −086
(−13)
050
(13) 013(02) −123(−17) −008(−01) −085(−12) −068(−11)
 −001
(−00)
000
(00) −006(−05) 003(02) −038(−09) 010(03) 007(04)
 −094
(−13)
055
(13) 002(01) −067(−12) −044(−10) −146(−18) −019(−05)
 036
(04) −020(04) 003(01) 044(06) 038(05) 085(09) 024(03)
The table reports the median value of the elasticities over all observations and
the corresponding t-statistic in parentheses. Bold entries highlight significant
results at the 10% level. The subscripts k, l, e, m, s refer to capital, labor,
energy, materials, and services.
6. Conclusion
Output adjustments have important consequences on input demands. This impact,
however, is rarely quantified, because with imperfectly competitive output markets,
IRS and externalities disturb the usual representative firm’s comparative statics. This
paper makes two contributions to the literature: (i) it provides a framework amend-
ing the representative firm model for the specification of aggregate input demand and
output supply functions; (ii) it shows that empirically the LCS principle is inherited
at the level of two-digit US manufacturing industries. The results suggest that, in US
manufacturing in the second half of the 20 century, input substitution has been rather
limited for a given output level. Output adjustments imply further important changes
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in the input mix. We find empirical support for IRS and markup pricing of moderate
size. This is important for understanding aggregate growth, investment and employ-
ment. There is, however, much heterogeneity over industries and time, and about 50%
of the observations are compatible with a rate of returns to scale near to one, and a
markup close to zero.
Aggregation eﬀects arise through shifts of market shares over firms within an industry.
These shifts seem to play a significant role for explaining the evolution of aggregate input
demands, but seem negligible for explaining changes in the marginal cost of production
and profit rate. These figures are well explained by complementary aspects of imperfect
competition: markup pricing, returns to scale and industry concentration. With only
aggregate data at hand, however, these eﬀects are diﬃcult to identify with precision.
7. Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
Let us rewrite (17) as:
 ( )−   ( )H
 (  ) = C (  )− (  )  (40)
which defines   (  ) 
Functions C (  )   ( ) and  ( ) are identified outside (40), but
 (  ) and H (  ) are unknown. The proof studies the conditions under which
functions  and H are unique (that is, separately identified). We extend Lau’s (1982)
proof, which focused on the case where H was a constant parameter.
Nonidentification means that there exist ∗ 6=  and H∗ 6= H such that for any
(  )
 ( )−   ( )H
∗ (  ) = C (  )−
∗ (  )  (41)
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We first note that there then exists a continuum of functions  and H compatible
with (40): any H∗∗ = H + (1− )H∗ and ∗∗ =  + (1− )∗ satisfy (40).13
Note also that  is identified iﬀ H is identified.
We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma A1. Let  and ∗ be two smooth functions defined on a set  and depending
on (  ) and strictly monotonic in  Then, there exists a function  such that
∗ (  ) =  ( (  )  )  (42)
Proof of Lemma A1.
Since both  and ∗ are monotonic in  we can write
 = −1 ( (  )  )
 = ∗−1 (∗ (  )  ) 
with the inverse function ∗−1 monotonic in its second argument. Hence
∗ (  ) = ∗ ¡−1 ( (  )  )  ¢
≡  ( (  )  )  (43)
This argument can be extended to nonmonotonic functions by splitting  into subsets
on which  and ∗ are monotonic in  . ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.
Using the notations of Lemma A1,  is identified iﬀ there exists a function  satisfying
 ( (  )  ) =  (  ) 
13 For  = −H∗ (H −H∗) we even obtain that H∗∗ = 0 which corresponds to perfect competition. This shows that
nonindentification would have far reaching consequences for empirical work.
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For
 (  ) ≡ C (  )− (  ) 
(42) becomes:
 ( )−   ( )H
∗ (  ) = 
∙
  ( )−   ( )H
 (  )  
¸

Diﬀerentiating this equation w.r.t.  yields

 ( ) +H
∗ (  ) 
2
  ( ) =
µ
 +H
 (  ) 
2
  ( )
¶

⇔ (1− )  ( ) =
2
  ( ) [H
 (  ) −H∗ (  )]  (44)
where  is the derivative of  w.r.t. its second argument. Under the assumptions of
Lemma A1,  6= 0 We consider the case where H and  are not identified. Then, by
(42), there exist triples (  ) such that  ( (  )  ) 6=  (  ) which implies
 6= 1 and by (44), H 6= H∗.
If  is a scalar, (44) is satisfied for any (   ) iﬀ  ≡ (1− )  (H −H∗) depends
only upon  in which case:
2 
 ( ) =  ( )
⇔  ln
µ
 ( )
¶
=  ( )
⇔  ( ) =  ( )  ()
⇔  ( ) =  ( ) () +  ( ) 
where  denotes a primitive of  If  is not a scalar, then (44) implies that

 ( ) =
2
2 ( ) 
By Leontief’s (1947) Proposition 1 on functional separability, there then exists a real
valued function  such that  ( ) = P ( ()). Suﬃciency is shown by Lau (1982,
p.97). ¤
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8. Appendix B: Data description
This study relies on data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for 18 two-
digit U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 1949-2001.14 Unfortunately, this
dataset based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) has been superseded after
the introduction of the North American Industry Classification in 2006. These SIC data
series are not longer updated by the BLS.
Although it would certainly be better to use data at a more disaggregated level, there
exist only few datasets comprising quantities and price indices at such level. This data
set comprises information on the price and quantity of output (  ) and of five inputs
(hence  = 5): capital ( ), labour ( ), energy (), intermediate material
input (), and services ( ). The evolution of these quantities over time is
depicted in Figure B1 at the aggregate level over all 18 industries. From Figure B1,
it seems clear that these variables (except perhaps labour input) are nonstationary. In
addition to the endogenous variables, several exogenous variables are also nonstationary.
14 Data are available upon request.
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Figure B1: The evolution of input quantities. Basis 100 in 1949
The profit rate  defined as the ratio of (gross) profit to sales, is an important
variable for assessing the relevance of imperfectly competitive behavior. Computing
this variable is not an easy task because profits depend on the user costs of capital
which are not observed and whose definition is not consensual. Diewert et al. (2004) is
a useful reference on this point. In this paper, we follow Diewert (2003) and retain the
user cost of capital formula,
 ≡  (1 + )− E [(1− )+1]  (45)
This equation shows that the user cost of capital  is increasing in the discounting
rate  and decreasing in the expectation errors on investment goods inflation (given by
+1 − E [+1]). According to Diewert (2003), we set  to 5% plus the consumer
price inflation rate and assume no expectation errors on +1. The few values of the
user costs found to be slightly negative (5 out of 954 cases) were replaced with 0.0001.
The time series of the profit rate  averaged over all 18 industries is depicted in
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Figure B2. In U.S. manufacturing industries, the profit rate is about 5.3 percent on
average over time and industries. This figure is somewhat diﬀerent from that of Basu
and Fernald (1997) who report an average profit rate of 3 percent. This discrepency is
related to diﬀerences in the time period and the industries covered, but certainly also
to the high sensitivity of the user costs of capital with respect to a priori assumptions
upon (i) the expected price change of investment goods and (ii) the discounting rate of
future income streams.
Given the sensitivity of the economic definition of the profit rate with respect to a
priori choices, it appears helpful to complete the picture with the more robust accounting
definition of the gross profit rate, which does not rely on the user cost of capital and
the capital stock, but uses instead investment and investment price:
 =  −
¡ +  +  +  + ¢
 
Notation  denotes gross investment and  its price. On average over time and
industries  is equal to 8.7 percent, which seems to confirm the rather high level of
profits in US manufacturing.
Average profitability over time and over industries is depicted in Figures B2 and
B3, respectively. The evolution of average profitability (Figure B2) broadly reflects the
business cycle, but there is also a downward trend or a break in this picture: whereas
the average (economic) profit rate was about 7.8 percent over the 1949-1975 period, it
declined to 2.8 percent for the post 1975 period. Such a pattern is actually observed for
many industries (not reported).
Figure B3 reports the average level of profitability over the period 1949-2001 for
each industry and shows that profitability varies a lot across industries. Two industries
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exhibit a negative average economic rate of profit: Textile Mills Products and Primary
Metal Industry (SIC numbers 22 and 33). For two industries, average profitability
exceeds 10 percent: Chemistry & Allied Products and Petroleum Refining (SIC 28 and
29). See Table B1 for the list of industry names with their corresponding SIC number.
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Figure B2: Profit rates over time (average over industries)
Let us now compare the accounting and economic profit rates. In general both con-
cepts diverge mainly because the accounting definition neglects the opportunity cost
of the investment in capital goods and reduces an investment decision with uncertain
returns to a static accounting exercise. From Figure B2, it can be seen that both con-
cepts are quantitatively very close for the 1949-75 period, but the accounting profit rate
becomes much larger than the economic profit rate after 1976. Similarly, Figure B3
shows that on average over the industries, the accounting profit rate is greater than
the economic profit rate. There is a simple relationship between  and  explaining
these facts. Gross investment is given by  =  − (1− )−1. In the steady
state,  =  and  = +1 (the user cost becomes  = 2) and the sole
purpose of investment is replacement:  =  It follows that in the steady state
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Figure B3: Profit rates over industries (average over time)
 = 2 and that  −  =  ()  In the steady state, the
diﬀerence between the accounting and economic profit is given by the investment share
in turn-over. So  provides an easily calculable upper bound for (steady-state) eco-
nomic profits, which helps to understand why in most cases    in Figures B2 and
B3. The fact that for the 1949-1975 period, we observed that  '  is mainly due to a
moderate nominal interest rate combined with high inflation for the investment goods
(so that   +1 in (45)).15
Table B1. The Standard Industrial Classification for U.S. manufacturing industries
SIC No Industry name SIC No Industry name
20 Food & kindred products 30 Rubber and misc. plastics products
21 Tobacco products industry 31 Leather and leather products
22 Textile mill products industry 32 Stone, clay, glass & concrete products
23 Apparel and other textile products 33 Primary metal industries
24 Lumber and wood products 34 Fabricated metal products
25 Furniture and fixtures 35 Industrial machinery and equipment
26 Paper and allied products 36 Electronic & other electric equipment
27 Printing and publishing 37 Transportation equipment
28 Chemical and allied products industry 38 Instruments, clocks, optical goods
29 Petroleum and coal products 39 Other manufacturing industries
15 The commodity prices index increased by 3.3% in average over the 1949-1975 period, and by 4.6% over 1976 to 2001.
For the price index of investment goods, the figures are respectively 4.3% and 3.5%.
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